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Abstract
Our goal in this paper is to study the market impact in a market in which order flow
is autocorrelated. We build a model which explains qualitatively and quantitatively the
empirical facts observed so far concerning market impact. We define different notions
of market impact, and show how they lead to the different price paths observed in the
literature. For each one, under the assumption of perfect competition and information,
we derive and explain the relationships between the correlations in the order flow,
the shape of the market impact function while a meta-order is being executed, and
the expected price after the completion. We also derive an expression for the decay of
market impact after a trade, and show how it can result in a better liquidation strategy
for an informed trader. We show how, in spite of auto-correlation in order-flow, prices
can be martingales, and how price manipulation is ruled out even though the bare
impact function is concave. We finally assess the cost of market impact and try to
make a step towards optimal strategies.
1 Introduction
Market impact has been studied in more and more detail lately, and its understanding is
important for different reasons. If one considers the market from the outside, the market
impact represents the quantity of information conveyed by the trades - the information being
summarized in the price. Its understanding is therefore a step towards the understanding
of the price process, of its stability - or instability - and its causes. If on the contrary one
considers the market from the inside, the market impact represents the impact of our trade
on the price, ie the fundamental cost of executing an order. This cost is not fixed a priori,
and should depend on the execution strategy, ie the way one submits the order while other
trades occur. We have already described here two types of market impacts: in order to be
clear throughout the paper, let us give some definitions first.
The Bare Market Impact is the impact of the orders sent by the whole market. It is the
most fundamental and universal quantity, since the associated phenomenon can be modeled
and its understanding will allow us to understand all the other types of market impact. Let
us explain. Market impact is equivalently the way the market reacts to trades: but since the
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market does not know who sends the orders, it can only respond to the whole order flow -
this, and only this, can be modeled and give us the bare market impact. When, like here,
one looks at the aggregation of all the trades, there is no ambiguity regarding the definition,
since the price path is equal to the impact. This definition may be useful if one wants to
study the market as a whole, the price process, or simply find the appropriate response to
trades, etc. But an actor inside the market is essentially interested in his own impact, which
leads to our next definitions.
The Renormalized Market Impact is the impact of a trade submitted by one actor, ie the
shift in the price which comes from his trade. This must not be mistaken with the Observed
Market Impact, which is the price at which the actor trades - imagine for instance that an
actor buy while there is a downwards trend : the observed market impact would then be
negative but he would still have a positive impact on the price.
Let us make a step further in these definitions. The observed phenomenon is the following:
when a buy meta order is sent, its immediate effect is to move the price upwards, and it
is observed that after completion the prices decreases to a price that we will call p∞. The
interpretation is simple. Obviously, the immediate effect of a buy order is to push the price
up, both because it is a positive signal saying that the price is too low, and because it eats
the orders on only one side of the order-book. The decrease observed afterwards will be
described in detail later, and can be seen as a refill on the depleted side of the order book.
This leads to two new definitions.
The Transient Bare Market Impact is the price path while information is conveyed to the
market - or during what we will call a trend.
The Permanent Bare Market Impact is the impact which remains after the decay. Ie, if
while the market is in equilibrium - as many buy and sell orders of any kind - an actor sends
buy orders, the price while he trades will be equal to the transient bare market impact and
after completion it will decrease to the permanent bare market impact. This virtual actor
represents in reality the aggregation of actors who participate to the trend. In the same way,
one can define these quantities for individual trades (ie the renormalized impact).
Whereas the bare market impact is universal, the observed market impact depends on the
strategy. Therefore, one must be careful when one analyzes the observed market impact. For
example, we will see that according to the quality of the strategy, there may be no decrease
after completion, or the observed permanent impact can be zero or even negative. In the
first case, corresponding to the trend initiator, the execution price is lower than the average,
whereas in the second case, corresponding to the trend follower, the execution price is higher
than the average : this raises the issue of information, and of the relevance of betting with
no information - or late information. This will be studied quantitatively later.
Remark 1.1. In the whole paper, we study the impact of the information contained only
in the trades - that is to say, private information. The case of public information which is
received simultaneously by all the actors is different, and should result in a jump with little
or few transactions.
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2 Representation of the market
We consider a market in which there are correlations in the order flow (it is essentially found
to be power-law, as shown in [10]). We want to understand how the market reacts to these
trades, which represent some information (public or private), assuming perfect competition
for the actors who react to the trades (giving rise to a zero-profit condition, as for the market
maker in [7] for example). Understanding this reaction will by definition allow one to find
the expression of the market impact of trades, for each definition of the impact.
Contrary to what is sometimes done in the literature, we do not need to introduce dif-
ferent agents with distinct behaviors to find an equilibrium (which would lead to conceptual
problems, as emphasized in [4]: one could hardly imagine that there could be any compe-
tition between perfectly intelligent agents and agents with no intelligence at all in financial
markets). Our way to decompose the market does not take into account the individual par-
ticipants, but is purely statistical. We decompose the order-flow in two components: the
signal (which we will call informed trades) and the noise (which we will call uninformed
trades). Note that these two components do not represent actual agents: each trader could
contribute to both. A personification is made for convenience; this allows us to define the
following representation of the market:
• The informed trader generates autocorrelation in the order sign process (order flow for
short) according to the order-splitting model of [8]. This virtual actor represents the
current trend in the whole market, and thus an aggregation of trades from possibly
many different actors. His existence comes from the fact that long-ranged information
is incorporated in the market (especially information that is not available to all the
actors, so that for the other actors the only information is the meta-order itself: in the
case of public information, one would simply expect jumps in the price). In particular,
if the distribution of meta-orders is power-law with exponent γ so that
P[l > L] ∼ 1
Lγ
,
the autocorrelation function of order flow decays as
ρ(τ) ∼ 1
τ γ−1
.
• The noise trader sends totally random market orders. Recall that these two agents may
not correspond to actual agents, but only to behaviors: each agent could contribute to
informed and noise trading at the same time.
• The reaction of the market to these orders is done by the rest of the market, which we
will call market makers. Market makers send limit orders and set the bid and ask, and
the corresponding volumes. By assuming perfect competition between market makers,
we can assume that there is only one market maker. This agent is also virtual and could
represent actual market makers as well as arbitragers or any other market participant
(so there is no reason to consider any cash limit in the aggregate).
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A key to our approach is that we assume perfect information, i.e. that the market maker
is able to detect the meta-order that is sent by the informed trader. This amounts to saying
that he is able to detect the trends since we reason in the aggregate at that point, which
does not seem unreasonable.
Remark 2.1. With what we call perfect information, the price does not respond to noise
trading: the market maker knows whether the trader is informed or uninformed and sets
the price in function of the information uniquely - whereas in the reality he only knows that
afterwards, since he needs a signal/noise decomposition. The price path we derive should thus
be viewed as be the expectation of the actual price path. The impact of imperfect information
will be studied later in the article.
3 Market making strategy and bare market impact
We now find a competitive market making strategy for the market model defined above (i.e.
in which market makers cannot make profits on average). A straightforward argument leads
us to conclude that the absence of correlations between the market maker’s decisions and the
informed trades always leads to super-diffusion on long time scales in the presence of long-
ranged correlations; to ensure price diffusion as in [3], the market maker’s adaptive reaction
to correlated market order flow must be to submit correlated limit orders. Following our
previous reasoning, we assume that the market maker decomposes his orders into two parts:
the orders in response to noise traders and the orders in response to informed traders. The
strategy adopted to satisfy the noise traders is simply to refill the queue when a trade occurs,
since no information is conveyed so the state of the order book has no reason to change. In
contrast to traditional treatments such as [7] or[2], we do not require any notion of fair value
nor is there any implication that traders may have information about the ex-post stock price.
As we just said, under our assumption of perfect information, noise traders do not change
the net volume at the best quote. Therefore, to study transient impact, we need only con-
sider the interaction between the informed trader and the market maker (i.e. the reaction
of the market to the information conveyed by the trades).
Suppose that the market maker has already sold L shares to the informed trader, moving
the ask price to p > 0 (without loss of generality, we set the starting price to zero). The
market maker then knows that the meta-order is of length at least L and must decide how
many limit orders to post at price p (in ticks). Imposing perfect competition so that the
expected profit of the market maker for this trade is zero (or equivalently to ensure that
the price process is a martingale), the price p must be the expectation of the price after
the meta-order is completed (this is very similar to [7]). He must then post vp shares at p
according to the following rule:
p = E[p∞ |v = vp , l ≥ L] (3.1)
where p∞ = limt→∞ pt.
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In this stylized version of our model, only informed trades move the price which is thus
a deterministic function of L. The final price p and the reversion price p∞ are then both de-
terministic. As we commented above, in real markets, because of asymmetry of information,
noise trades also move the price since information is not known a priori (introducing noise in
the price path): we should then view p and p∞ as expectations of actual prices. Denote the
total length of the meta-order (unknown to the market maker) by l and the maximum price
reached at the end of the meta-order by pmax. Then, either l > L + vp and the meta-order
exhausts the available quantity at p, causing the price to increase to p+1, or L ≤ l ≤ L+vp,
p = pmax, the meta-order completes, and the price reverts to p∞. Denote the probability that
the meta-order completes by q(p) (which we will write q to simplify the notations). Then
because pt is a martingale,
p = q p∞ + (1− q) (p+ 1) (3.2)
so the decay after completion is
∆(p) := p− p∞ = 1− q
q
. (3.3)
Now denote the order size required to consume limit orders up to price p by Lp =
∑p
k=0 vp
and the tail distribution function of meta-order sizes by F˜ (L) = P(l ≥ L). By definition,
q = P(l < Lp|l ≥ Lp−1) and 1− q = P(l ≥ Lp|l ≥ Lp−1) so
∆(p) =
P(l ≥ Lp|l ≥ Lp−1)
P(l < Lp|l ≥ Lp−1)
=
F˜ (Lp)
F˜ (Lp−1)− F˜ (Lp)
. (3.4)
Equation (3.4) thus relates the distribution of meta-order sizes to the reversion levels. We
emphasize that equation(3.4) is valid for any given meta-order size distribution and not just
for the power-law case explored below in Section 4.
Remark 3.1. Note that the price must revert immediately to p∞ after completion if the
market maker can tell when the meta-order ends. In real markets, such information is
partial and is inferred from observations (cf. section 4.6); the price after completion decays
over time to p∞. This violation of the zero-profit condition results in information asymmetry
which, as we will see in section 8.1 can be exploited to devise an optimal execution strategy.
But we can go further still. Assuming again that there is perfect competition so that the
market maker makes zero profit in expectation for any meta-order size of size Lp, we have
Lp p∞ =
p∑
k=0
k vk (3.5)
which then gives
∆(p) = p− p∞ = p− 1
Lp
p∑
k=0
k vk (3.6)
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Remark 3.2. Equations (3.2) and (3.5) are precisely the Martingale Condition and the Fair
Pricing condition of [4] respectively. However, in our model, both (3.2) and (3.5) result from
imposing perfect competition between market makers and not any notion of fair pricing.
Remark 3.3. Whereas making zero profit on average for all order sizes naturally comes from
perfect competition, the zero profit condition for each size can be viewed as a second order
condition: it is indeed the strategy which minimizes P&L volatility for the market maker -
and makes his profit independent from possible fluctuations or estimation errors.
Remark 3.4. To be consistent, we should impose condition (3.5) on orders of all possible
sizes l and not just l = Lp for some p. This however just complicates the argument and
does not change our asymptotic results. A comment should be done here about the tick.
Indeed, if one wants to impose the above conditions for any order size l, one has to consider
a continuous underlying price. Our equations are accurate for l = Lp because then the
underlying prices reaches an integer multiple of the tick - then the trade is done at the fair
price. The difference between the underlying price and the actual discrete price, of order
one tick, is actually the premium associated with queue priority - and is a compensation for
putting orders long in advance. To state our condition in all generality for all l, we should
write that the average price paid is the fair price plus this queue priority premium.
After a little manipulation, we find that (3.6) may be rewritten as
∆(p) =
1
Lp
p−1∑
k=0
Lk. (3.7)
In particular, since Lk ≤ Lp for all k ≤ p, we must have 0 ≤ ∆(p) ≤ p. It follows that for
any p > 0, ∆(p) can be expressed in the form
∆(p) = α(p) p
with α(p) ∈ (0, 1]. That is, the trade price always reverts after completion, no matter what
the distribution of meta-order sizes is.
3.1 Solving for the latent order book
We may then compute the vp recursively by equating (3.4) and (3.7):
F˜ (Lp−1 + vp)
F˜ (Lp−1)− F˜ (Lp−1 + vp)
=
1
Lp−1 + vp
p−1∑
k=0
Lk.
Next, we derive a recursive expression for the ∆(p) as follows. From (3.4),
F (Lp) =
F (Lp−1)
1 + 1
∆(p)
so
F (Lp) =
p∏
k=1
(
1 +
1
∆(k)
)−1
F (L0) (3.8)
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which gives us a recursive relation for ∆(p):
∆(p) =
p−1∑
k=0
F−1
[∏k
i=1
(
1 + 1
∆(i)
)−1
F (L0)
]
F−1
[∏p
i=1
(
1 + 1
∆(i)
)−1
F (L0)
] (3.9)
Together, for any given meta-order size distribution F (·), equations (3.8) and (3.9) allow
us to plot the evolution of the stock price during execution and the ultimate price level
after completion (corresponding to permanent impact). We can see that both depend only
on F (·), knowledge of which according to the order-splitting model of [4] is equivalent to
knowledge of the shape of the autocorrelation function of order signs. The parameter L0
(which is also the volume at p = 0) is however not fixed by these equations; it sets the scale
for the market impact function. As we will see in section 3.2, it directly depends on the
volatility and can be uniquely determined.
3.2 Price volatility
The scale of the market impact function, which is a priori unknown (since L0 is not fixed),
can be directly related to the price volatility (and can thus easily be estimated). Indeed, for
a meta-order of size l, if we note pmax(l) the maximum prices reached after completion and
p∞(l) the reversion price, the total volatility per unit volume is
σ2l =
p∞(l)2
l
=
(pmax(l)−∆(pmax(l)))2
l
(3.10)
Assuming a participation rate µ for the informed trader, the actual volatility is then
σ2 = µ
E (pmax(l)2(1− α(pmax(l)))2)
E(l)
(3.11)
Remark 3.5. The participation rate µ can be estimated from the correlations. Indeed, for a
given asymptotic behavior of the correlation function (and thus a given distribution for the
meta-orders), the scale is fixed by µ. More details will be given in the next section in the
case of power-law correlations.
Remark 3.6. The volatility we compute here is the long-term volatility, corresponding to
the scale where the price is diffusive. But we can also see that the instantaneous volatility
clearly depends on the current state of the market and the current correlations - its exact
computation would require to add a real reaction noise traders though.
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4 Power-law distribution of meta-order sizes
When meta-order sizes are power-law distributed with exponent γ so that F (x) ∼ x−γ,
equation (3.4) simplifies to
∆(p) = p− p∞ = 1(
Lp
Lp−1
)γ
− 1
=
1(
1 + vp
Lp−1
)γ
− 1
(4.1)
which again gives a relation between the volume that the market maker must add when the
price reaches p and Lp−1 market orders have been executed, and the post-completion price
p∞, such that the price process is a martingale and expected profit is zero.
From the definition of α(p) and equation (3.9), we obtain the following recursive formula
for α(p):
α(p) =
1
p
p−1∑
k=0
1∏p−1
i=k+1
(
1 + 1
α(i) i
) 1
γ
(4.2)
Plots of α(p) for several values of γ are presented in Figure 1.
Remark 4.1. The factors for small k in (4.2) are accurate only if F (L) = L−γ for any L,
whereas of course we only have F (L) ∼ L−γ. Thus (4.2) should give the correct asymptotic
behavior of α(p) for large p, but not for small p.
Figure 1: α(p) for F (L) = L−γ (left) and F (L) ∼ L−γ (right); black γ = 0.3, red γ = 0.5,
blue γ = 0.7. As an indication, the corresponding asymptotic values α∞ = (γ − 1)/γ. The
singular behavior for small p is due to the approximations described in remarks 3.4 and 4.1.
If α(p) converges to some α∞ ∈ (0, 1] consistent with the plots in Figure 1 we may
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compute this limit. Taking logarithms of (3.8) gives
logLp = logL0 +
1
γ
p∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
1
α(k) k
)
∼ log p
α∞ γ
as p→∞
so
p(L) ∼ C Lα∞ γ as L→∞. (4.3)
The perfect competition condition for the market maker can now be approximated for large
p by:
p∞ =
1
Lp
∫ Lp
0
p(L) dL = C
1
Lp
∫ Lp
0
Lα∞ γdL =
p
α∞ γ + 1
which then gives
1− α∞ = 1
α∞ γ + 1
and finally, consistent with Figure 1,
α∞ =
γ − 1
γ
.
We now have the entire price path, assuming power-law F (·) or equivalently a power-law
autocorrelation function of order signs:
• While the meta-order is being executed, we have from (4.3) that
p ∼ CLδp. (4.4)
with δ := γ − 1.
• After completion, the price reverts to the level
p∞ ∼ 1
γ
p =
1
1 + δ
p. (4.5)
Square-root impact obviously corresponds to δ = 1/2 in which case (1−α∞) = 2/3 as found
in [4].
Remark 4.2. The relationship (4.3) between market impact and order size is very reminis-
cent of the work of Gabaix et al.
Remark 4.3. Had we performed the above computations with F exponential rather than
power-law, we would have found exponential transient impact and a relative permanent impact
(1−α(p))→ 0. Our model computations assuming F (L) ∼ L−γ are consistent with empirical
estimates of both the autocorrelation function of order flow ([9] for example) and the evolution
of the price during meta-order execution.
10
Figure 2: The theoretical market impact function, for (left) α = 1/3 and γ = 0.5 and (right)
α = 1/3 and γ = 0.7, in log-log scale. For comparison, a line of slope (left) 0.5 and (right)
0.56.
Figure 3: The same curves as above, in normal scale. For each couple (α, γ), the theoretical
impact function is almost equal to the corresponding power-law extrapolation.
Remark 4.4. Note that we do not assume that the size distributions of buy and sell meta-
orders are the same. Consequently, buy and sell orders may have different market impact.
As we mentioned before, the scale of the market impact function, i.e. the constant C,
can be related to the volatility per unit volume. If we put together the results 4.4, 4.5 and
eq.3.11,
σ2 = µ
E
((
1
δ+1
)2
C2l2δ
)
E(l)
= µ
(
1
δ + 1
)2
C2
E
(
l2δ
)
E(l)
(4.6)
which gives the value for C:
C = (δ + 1)σ
√
E(l)
µE (l2δ)
(4.7)
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The asymptotical expression of the market impact is therefore
pmax(l) = (δ + 1)
√
E(l)
µE (l2δ)
σlδ (4.8)
and the permanent impact is
p∞(l) =
√
E(l)
µE (l2δ)
σlδ (4.9)
Remark 4.5. The impact is proportional to the volatility, which is what one would expect.
Remark 4.6. The term
√
E(l)
E(l2δ)
is close to 1 when γ ' 1.5 (and δ = γ − 1 = 0.5), which is
the case in practice.
Remark 4.7. Until now we have considered unit volumes. One can also express the market
impact in function of the volatility per trade σT , by taking into account the average volume
of trades n:
pmax(l) = (δ + 1)
√
E(l)
µE (l2δ)
σT√
n
lδ (4.10)
One could equivalently consider the distribution of l
n
instead of l in the whole work.
Remark 4.8. For δ = 1/2, pmax(l) = cte.σ
√
l
n
, which is exactly the relationship pustulated
in [9].
4.1 Correlations under power-law market impact: what about the
reverse?
We have so far derived the expression of market impact in the case where the sign process
gives rise to power-law correlations with a given exponent γ, without wondering where this
exponent comes from. We do not intend to prove that the whole state of the market is
optimal, but to show that the hypothesis is consistent with the results, if one considers the
inverse problem.
Gabaix has shown that for the observed distribution of fund sizes (i.e. power law with
exponent 1), and for the behavior described below, the square-root market impact (δ = 1/2)
leads to the exponent γ = 1.5 for the correlations: this is consistent with our model since
we find that δ = γ − 1. We can even generalize his result for any δ > 0. Indeed, if one
makes the computation for any market impact exponent δ, one finds that the exponent of
the correlation function is γ = δ + 1. The results are thus consistent, and one can assume
that the power-law behavior is a stable equilibrium.
12
Remark 4.9. The exponent γ is not fixed by these results, which means that it can potentially
vary across the markets, the countries, etc without losing the optimality (at least to the extent
that the markets are uncorrelated). Highly correlated markets are likely to have similar
exponents though.
4.2 Empirical estimation of δ
The well-known square-root formula for market impact is consistent with price evolution
during meta-order execution of the form p ∼ √L. On the other hand, various empirical
studies indicate that p ∼ Lδ with δ ∈ (0.5, 0.7) (fig.4). Either way, in our model, there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the average evolution of the price during meta-
order execution and the distribution of meta-order sizes: the exponent of the market impact
function can be estimated by measuring the correlations in the order flow.
Figure 4: Market impact for Capital Fund Management proprietary trades on futures mar-
kets, in the period June 2007 - December 2010 ([9]).
4.3 The informational content of trades and diffusion
In our model, every (informed) trade has permanent impact, which means that information
is indeed incorporated in the price consistent with economic theory. Yet this is not in
contradiction with price diffusion, for the simple reason that the impact is not constant but
depends on the size of the meta-order. Which, in other terms, means that the information
per trade in a large meta-order is smaller. The explanation is simple: the immediate impact
of a trade is the inverse of the volume at the opposite best quote, which increases with the
size of the meta-order. Therefore, our model not only considers the impact of market orders,
but a joint impact of market and limit orders: this is a way to include the order book shape
and the order flow history in the computation of market impact.
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4.4 The latent order book
With δ ≈ 1/2 as empirically observed, our model leads naturally to a quasi-linear latent
order book as defined in [9] (exactly linear if δ = γ − 1 = 1/2). Specifically, the volume vp
that the market maker posts at price p can be interpreted as the latent volume that would
emerge if the price were to reach p. Our model provides an explanation for the quasi-linearity
of the latent order book postulated in [9]: In our model, this latent order book shape reflects
the adaptive reaction of the market-maker under perfect competition to autocorrelated order
flow. Fig.5 and 6 represent the volume vp in function of p and the increase in volume from
price p to price p+ 1: dp = vp+1 − vp. The expression of the latent volume can be derived:
vp = Lp − Lp−1 ∼
( p
C
) 1
γ−1 −
(
p− 1
C
) 1
γ−1
∼
( p
C
) 1
γ−1
(
1−
(
1− 1
p
) 1
γ−1
)
∼ 1
γ − 1
( p
C
) 1
γ−1−1
(4.11)
For γ = 1.5, we find a linear latent volume.
Figure 5: (left) The latent volume vp for γ = 0.5 and thus α = 1/3. (right) The marginal
volume dp.
4.5 Diffusivity of the price
It is straightforward to verify by simulation that the price diffuses on almost all timescales in
our model as we ensured by imposing the Martingale Condition (3.2). Philosophically, the
market price diffuses in our model because autocorrelation in the flow of market orders which
would otherwise result in superdiffusion of the price, is compensated by autocorrelation in
the limit order flow corresponding to the adaptive reaction of the market maker under perfect
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Figure 6: (left) The latent volume vp for γ = 0.7 and thus α ' 0.41. (right) The marginal
volume dp. The latent volume is now sub-linear.
competition, as empirically observed in [10]. If limit orders are only passive and thus are
not correlated with market orders, one can show that the price cannot diffuse for long time
scales, as illustrated on figure 7.
Figure 7: Volatility as a function of time for γ = 0.7, for (left) the -Intelligence Market for
a non-zero cancelation rate and (right) our model. We see that our model ensures diffusion
even though market order flow is highly autocorrelated.
To be more precise, one can show that if limit orders are passive the volatility per trade
behaves like σ2t ∼ t2−γ
(
1− a tγ
T
)
where t is the period on which the volatility is computed,
T the total period that is considered and 0 < a < 1 is a constant (this asymptotic formula
is accurate provided tγ < T ).The reasons for this behavior are the following:
• for t  T 1γ , the growth proportional to t2−γ is due to the power-law correlations in
market orders.
• but the events that are too rare to occur in the period T are not observed with high
probability. Thus, instead of increasing as a power-law, the volatility stagnates with
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high probability at a level proportional to T
2−γ
γ . Of course, this stagnation is artificial
and cannot be seen as diffusion.
These two regimes are indeed observed on fig 7.
Remark 4.10. We recall that prices are diffusive when σ2t does not depend on t.
4.6 Model for the decay of market impact
As we have seen before, the decay of market impact after completion of the meta-order is
a key of the competition between the market maker and the informed trader since it allows
the informed trader to execute his order at a better average price for the same permanent
impact (which results in a loss for the market maker). In the continuity of the previous
sections, and under the same hypothesis, we derive an expression for the shape of the decay.
Here, market makers are no longer assumed to make zero-profit (otherwise there would be
no optimal execution strategy for the informed trader), but they are supposed to minimize
their loss (and they still cannot make profits on average). Actually the real reason for market
makers to be present is the noise trader, from which he always makes profits. The presence
of informed traders cannot be profitable for him (otherwise they would not trade), but he
can still optimize his strategy as far as they are concerned. A remark is that the fair price
condition introduced in [4] is violated under these assumptions. This is a major difference
between the two models, since in ours the perfect competition takes place between the mar-
ket makers, but the informed trader is not assumed to trade at a fair price. In other words,
for the same permanent impact (since prices are not manipulable) he can take advantage of
the asymmetry of information to try to optimize his execution.
Assume that the informed trader was trading at rate µ until time tmax (the price is then
pmax, the number of informed trades is L). While he does not trade again, there are two op-
tions (each of one results in a loss for the market maker). Either the informed trader has not
finished, in which case the price should remain pmax (if not the loss is ∆1(p)), or he is, and the
price should be p∞ (if not the loss is ∆2(p)). Our goal is to quantify these losses and define
the price so that at each time the expectation of the loss is minimized. Right after the last
trade, there is a large probability that the informed trader is still here, and the price must
be close to pmax since ∆1(p) must be minimized, but each noise trade decreases this prob-
ability and after a while the price should return to p∞ (since then ∆1(p) must be minimized).
Let us compute the loss ∆1(p) conceded to the informed trader if he resumes trading at
time tmax + t > tmax (loss which is due to the decay: the asset is sold at a lower price), after
L trades. Let us define L+Leq as the number of trades after which the price has reached the
correct price again (cf. Fig.8, at time tmax + t + teq), and I(l) the transient market impact
function for l informed trades.
The loss conceded to the informed trader during the period if he is still here, in comparison
with the case when the informed trader does not stop trading (or the price does not decays)
can be approximated by:
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Figure 8: Decay of market impact and notations. In blue, the market impact, and in black,
the virtual market impact if there were no decay between tmax and tmax + t. The loss ∆1(p)
is represented in red. After teq, the price is back to the price that would be set without
decay.
∆1(ptmax+t) =
∫ Leq
0
I(L+ l)dl −
∫ Leq
0
(ptmax+t + I(l))dl (4.12)
We make here the approximation that the meta-order is still large enough to reach L+Leq
(but anyway it would certainly be suboptimal for the informed trader not to trade the
maximum quantity below the fair price, and if not it would be arbitraged). If the informed
trader is no longer here, the potential loss is:
∆2(ptmax+t) = Lptmax+t −
∫ L
0
I(l)dl (4.13)
and is due to the fact that the previous meta-order has been executed on average below
ptmax+t, which is the new reference price for the new possible meta-order. In assuming that
the market maker can detect the end of a meta-order, one would only consider ∆2(ptmax+t)
and not ∆1(ptmax+t), and find an immediate decay to the fair price (which we will call pfair)
as in [4]. ptmax+t must be fixed according to:
ptmax+t = arg min
pfair≤p≤pmax
(P (1|t)∆1(p) + P (2|t)∆2(p)) (4.14)
where P (1|t) and P (2|t) are the probabilities of the different events given that t noise
trades have occurred since the last informed trade. We bound p since because of the com-
petitive behavior the market maker cannot make money on average, either by increasing the
price over pmax or by decreasing it below p∞. In addition, the following relation defines Leq:
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ptmax+t + I(Leq) = I(L+ Leq) (4.15)
By injecting this expression in the previous minimization, we find:
Leq = arg min
pfair≤I(L′)≤pmax
(P (1|t)[
∫ L′
0
I(L+ l)dl −
∫ L′
0
(I(L+ L′)− I(L′) + I(l))dl]
+P (2|t)[L(I(L+ L′)− I(L′))−
∫ L
0
I(l)dl])
(4.16)
By taking the derivative, we find the very simple condition (without the condition pfair ≤
I(l′) ≤ pmax):
Leq
L
=
P (2|t)
P (1|t) (4.17)
And thus the value of ptmax+t:
ptmax+t = max(
1
L
∫ L
0
I(l)dl, I(
L
P (1|t))− I(
LP (2|t)
P (1|t) )) (4.18)
Where the first argument is pfair. Before using the explicit forms of the quantities above
to find the decay function, let us make some comments about the general form. If P (1|t) = 1,
which means that the informed trader is still here with probability 1, this formula gives
ptmax+t = I(L), which means that ptmax+t = pmax (which is what we would expect). But if
on the contrary P (1|t) = 0, then ptmax+t = pfair since the second argument tends to 0.
For an impact function of the form p = CLγ,
ptmax+t
pmax
= max(
1
γ + 1
, (
1
P (1|t))
γ − (P (2|t)
P (1|t))
γ) (4.19)
We notice that this gives directly the ratio ptmax+t
pmax
: the process is scale invariant with
respect to p. Moreover, it would not seem unrealistic to assume that the market maker
estimates P (1, t) as a function f(t/tmax) (this would mean that he considers the trading
time as a characteristic time of the informed trader). This would give a scale invariance with
respect to t. For example, assume that
P (1|t) = (1− 1
tmax
)t ' e− ttmax (4.20)
then
ptmax+t
pmax
= max(
1
γ + 1
, (
1
(1− 1
tmax
)t
)γ − (1− (1−
1
tmax
)t
(1− 1
tmax
)t
)γ) (4.21)
In particular, for t tmax,
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pmax − ptmax+t
pmax
∼ ( t
tmax
)γ (4.22)
Figure 9: The market impact function for (red) γ = 0.5, (black) γ = 0.6 and (blue) γ = 0.7,
for the estimator of P (1|t) above. The length of the meta-order and the participation rate
do not influence the shape in relative coordinates.
Note that ptmax+t has been computed for continuous prices. For discrete prices, the mar-
ket maker would need to minimize on a discrete ensemble (but this would not change any
price by more than a tick).
Even though the exact shape of the decay may vary according to the estimator, according
to our model the impact function comes back to p∞ after a time which is proportional to
the trading time tmax. This is enough information to find optimal execution strategies (cf.
section 8).
5 Renormalized market impact
In some way, the previous results are only preliminary and remain abstract. They only allow
to define the fundamental properties of the market in which the agents trade, and give his
properties in the aggregate. Now, in this framework, the real quantities can be computed
(with little effort): in particular the renormalized market impact which is so important to
traders.
Contrary to what is often done in the literature, we do not assume that each agent has
a well-defined impact, and that their sum gives the price process. On the contrary, here the
sum of all the agents have a fixed impact, and the impact of a trader depends on the way
he fits into this global process - the impact being thus very revealing of the quality of his
strategy as we will discuss.
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5.1 The impact on prices
So far, we have considered only the very stylized scenario where there is only one informed
trader and the market maker knows whether his counterparty is informed or uninformed. We
now consider the more realistic scenario where an informed trader (trader A) sends market
orders while other informed traders are trading.
To study the impact of trader A, we must separate his meta-order from the aggregated
orders of the other actors (trader B for short). When trader A is not present, trader B
behaves as in the previous model, submitting meta-orders thereby generating power-law au-
tocorrelated order flow. We now compute the market impact of a meta-order of length l
submitted by trader A while trader B is trading.
We assume the following:
• Trader A’s participation rate µ˜ is constant,
• This participation rate is smaller than the participation rate µ of trader B: µ˜  µ
(which is not necessary but gives simpler results),
• We call lA the volume that trader A wants to trade.
If trader A trades a volume ∆l when both actors have the same sign (resp. an opposite
sign), his market impact for this partial volume (provided ∆l  l, which will be verified
since µ˜ µ) is
pA+,l(∆l) = I(l + ∆l)− I(l) ' ∆lI ′(l) (5.1)
pA−,l(∆l) = I(l)− I(l −∆l) ' ∆lI ′(l) (5.2)
Under our hypothesis, the total trading time of trader A is of order lA
µ˜
. His total perma-
nent impact (which is now the only relevant quantity, since the trades are quite spaced) is
the sum of his impacts in each period where trader B has a defined trend (i.e. pA+,li(∆li) if
trader B buys a volume li in his i
th period, pA−,li(∆li) if he sells it). ∆li is here the volume
that trader A buys in the ith period.
Now if the trading rate of trader A is constant, if we define N = min
(
n|∑Nj=0 ljµ > lAµ˜ )
as the number of times that the trend of trader B changes during the trade (and re-defining
lN so that
∑N
j=0
lj
µ
= lA
µ˜
),
∆li =
li∑N
j=0 lj
lA (5.3)
Therefore, knowing the lengths li and therefore N the total impact is:
20
I(lA) =
N∑
i=0
∆liI
′(li)
=
N∑
i=0
liI
′(li)∑N
j=0 lj
lA
=
µ˜
µ
N∑
i=0
liI
′(li) (5.4)
The average renormalized impact function I(lA) is therefore:
I(lA) =
µ˜
µ
E
(
N∑
i=0
liI
′(li)|
N∑
j=0
lj
µ
=
lA
µ˜
)
(5.5)
In the case where correlations are power-law, this becomes
I(lA) =
µ˜
µ
Cδ
δ + 1
E
(
N∑
i=0
lδi |
N∑
j=0
lj =
µ
µ˜
lA
)
(5.6)
Remark 5.1. In the particular case where there is only one period (either because lA is very
small or because l0 happens to be very large), I(lA) ∼ lδA. The constant is smaller than Cδ+1
though because the trades of trader A are mixed with the trades of trader B. The opposite
situation (ie for large N) is studied below, and in this case the market impact is linear. The
reality is between these limit case. If the trading time of trader A is small, his market impact
is square root. But when he trades slower, it tends to be linear (cf. fig.10).
If we don’t take into account the side effect due to l0 and lN (which becomes true for
large N),
I(lA) =
µ˜
µ
Cδ
δ + 1
E
(
lδ0
)
E (l0)
lA (5.7)
which means that the asymptotic impact is linear.
Remark 5.2. The market impact always tends to be linear on long time scales, which rules
out price manipulation on that time scales.
Remark 5.3. This linearity rules out the possibility of a zero permanent impact. Indeed for
each new period the impact of the trades submitted in the previous periods would decrease to
0 and would not add so as to obtain the linearity.
Remark 5.4. Contrary to the measurement using the order flow imbalance (cf. section 6),
the finiteness of the set does not affect the exponent, but introduces a multiplicative constant
of the form (1 − a
lmax
) so that the empirical findings always under-estimate the bare impact
(the constant tends to 1 for an infinite set though).
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Figure 10: The average renormalized market impact function I(lA) versus the volume traded
by trader A (in log-log scale), with (blue) µ˜ = 0.5µ, (red) µ˜ = 0.1µ, (green) µ˜ = 0.01µ and
(black) µ˜ = 0.001µ. The renormalized impact tend from power-law to linear when the trading
rate decreases. Note that the slower the trading takes place, the lesser the market impact.
Remark 5.5. Throughout the end of the paper, the market impact function will be noted
Clδ, where C takes into account the appropriate rescaling effects.
Remark 5.6. We see a difference appear between the bare market impact (for market trends)
and the renormalized impact of individual trades (which can be executed over several trends).
This difference explains the apparent paradoxical co-existence of absence of manipulation and
concave impact.
5.2 The observed impact
As we discussed above, the observed impact may vary a lot among the actors. For example,
If an actor is always a trend-leader, he will observe a smaller decay after his trade than an
actor who is always a trend-follower (since one is at the beginning of the global trend and
the other at the end, and the reversion price for the global trend is the same for both).
The observed transient impact may also vary, leading to various power-law exponents if
one tries to make estimations ([1]). We have studied the case of a VWAP (constant trading
rate), in which case the strategy is independent from the background trends, and the impact
(observed and effective) is power-law with the same exponent than the bare impact and
becomes linear on long time scales. But trading strategies with varying rate may lead to
different observed impacts - different exponents for instance. One could even assume that
some traders are on average anti-correlated with the market, so that their observed impact
is negative.
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6 Price change and order flow imbalance
In our analysis, the impact is computed by someone who knows when the meta-order - or the
trend - begins. This can be computed by trading firms that know exactly when their order
begins and ends (or anyone provided one has some information about the origin of every
trade). If one wants to compute the market impact without knowing from whom the trades
come in estimating the price changes in function of the global imbalance in order flow, the
story is quite different.
Assume that one observes the impact of a global imbalance Q for L consecutive trades
randomly chosen, by estimating the difference between the price of the first trade and the
price of the last trade. We will call this the Aggregate Market Impact If we note N the
number of trends during the period, li the volume associated to each trend and I(li) the
permanent market impact associated to these trades, then
Iaggr(Q,L) = E
N∑
i=1
iI(li)− 1I(l1,<)− N(I(lN)− I(lN,>))|
∑N
i=1 ili − 1l1,< − N(lN − lN,>) = Q,∑N
i=1 li − l1,< − (lN − lN,>) = L (6.1)
where l1,< is the volume belonging to the first trend which was traded before the beginning
of the observation and lN − lN,> is the volume belonging to the last trend which is traded
after the end of the observation.
Remark 6.1. To be exact, one should consider the transient impact for the last period, since
for this period the price has not reverted yet to its permanent level. We do not consider this
side effect in order to simplify the computations.
For N = 1, L = Q and
Iaggr(Q, 1) = E [I(l1,< + L)− I(l1,<)|L]
=
∑
l≥L P (l1 = l)
∑l−L
k=0 [I(k + L)− I(k)]∑
l≥L P (l1 = l) (l + 1− L)
' cte
∑
l≥L l
−δ−2∑l−L
k=0
[
(k + L)δ − kδ]∑
l≥L l
−δ−2(l + 1− L)
' cte
∑
l≥L l
−δ−2Llδ∑
l≥L l
−δ−2(l + 1− L) for small L
' cte
∑
l≥L l
−2L∑
l≥L l
−δ
' cteLδ (6.2)
For small L and N = 1 (which is the case in fig.12 for the red curve, since it considers
only one trade.), the aggregated impact behaves as Lδ = Qδ.
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Figure 11: Aggregate market impact for different values of N , for δ = 0.5: strongly concave
for N = 1, then progressively linear for larger N . (left) In red, the market impact for one
observed trade, in function of its volume, in blue, the market impact for several trades, in
function of the aggregated order-flow (an intercept of -20 has been added to aid visualization).
(right) The same plots in log-log scale. The exponent of the apparent impact for single trades
is close to 0.25, quite smaller than δ. This is found empirically on fig.12
Remark 6.2. In the reality, the estimation of Iaggr(Q,L) is made for a finite set of events:
one do not observe events with small probabilities, i.e. l > lmax. Introducing this cut-off in
the expression of Iaggr(Q, 1) gives an expression of the form:
Iaggr(Q, 1) ' cteLδ(1− cte′ L
lmax
) (6.3)
which gives an even more concave function than Lδ: this is illustrated in fig.11, and
observed empirically (cf. fig.12). The apparent exponent is therefore smaller than δ in this
particular case.
On the contrary, in the extreme case where li = l0 ∀i),
Iaggr(Q,N − 1) = cteQ (6.4)
and the impact is linear.
Remark 6.3. One would expect that the exact solution of eq.6.1 is roughly linear for large
Q, and tends to a power-law with exponent of order δ for small L (and thus small Q). The
exact solutions of eq.6.1 are plotted on fig.11.
Remark 6.4. The interpretation is that for one (resp. a few) trades, the whole (resp. most
of the) volume belongs to the same trend. Thus it is possible to observe a concavity which
comes from the concavity of the bare market impact (but there is a priori no reason that both
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Figure 12: Aggregate market impact for the LSE stock Astrazeneca for 2000-2002 ([6]).
are equal, and even no reason that the exponent is the same as shown in fig.11). On the
contrary, when one considers a large number of trades, the market impact is overwhelmed by
trend changes and the aggregated impact tends to be linear since the trends are independent.
This exactly explains the observations in [6] (Fig.12).
7 Market impact and asymmetry of information, or
the impact of arbitragers
Until now, we have assumed that the market maker was able to detect the informed trades.
Under this assumption, and assuming perfect competition between the market makers, we
have found an expression for the transient and permanent market impact. We could wonder:
what if we introduce asymmetry of information, and the market maker can only estimate
the activity of informed traders to define his strategy? Could we take it into account in our
study?
To take it into account, we would have to upgrade the intelligence of the market maker.
This would need assumptions on their behavior, on their estimators, on the different models
that they actually use. Not only would that be purely hypothetical, but it would be far from
reality. Hundreds of traders have worked for decades to arbitrage the market and contribute
in making it more and more efficient, and we do not have the pretention to replace them in
one paper.
It is most probable that any algorithm we propose would be a lot further from reality
than the model in which the market maker is informed, because the market naturally tends
to this optimal state. Therefore, we do not claim to know what the market impact really is
(because it certainly changes as the actors change their strategies). We only claim to know
what it tends to be, when actors are more and more clever (which is certainly the case since
our findings pretty well account for reality).
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An interesting study though is to see what changes if we assume that information is
asymmetric. Indeed, as it introduces risk for the market makers, their trading would become
a trade-off between returns and risk, and they would no longer trade according to zero-profit
strategies. This could also happen if competition was not perfect, that is to say if there
were not enough arbitragers on the market to incite people finding more and more clever
strategies to make profits. Then the informed traders would no longer trade at the fair price
described in [4], but at higher prices, and they would probably have more transient impact
on the price (which would make it more unstable).
Let us try to quantify this loss. If informed traders trade at rate µ, a meta-order of
length l occurs on a time t ' l
µn
where n is the average size of a trade (this allows to have
t in trade time instead of unit volume time). With naive estimators, if Nnt is the average
number of trades from noise traders during time t, the imbalance in order flow due to noise
traders after time t (which is also the uncertainty on l) is of order
∆l ≈ n
√
Nnt ≈ n
(
lnt
n
)1/2
≈ n
(
1− µ
µ
l
n
)1/2
≈
√
1− µ
µ
(nl)1/2 (7.1)
Therefore, the uncertainty on the permanent market impact (i.e. the difference between
the average trading price the price after reversion, which must be set by the market maker
to counterbalance the uncertainty) is of order
∆p∞(l) ≈ C
δ + 1
(
l +
√
1− µ
µ
nl
)δ
− C
δ + 1
lδ
≈ C
δ + 1
lδ
(1 +√(1− µ)n
µl
)δ
− 1

≈ Cδ
δ + 1
√
(1− µ)n
µ
lδ−1/2
≈ δσT
√
1− µ
µ
lδ−1/2
E (l2δ−1)
(7.2)
Remark 7.1. For the common values of the correlation exponent γ, this is roughly constant
(recall that δ = γ − 1 ≈ 1/2).
Remark 7.2. ∆p∞ can be regarded as an inefficiency prime per trade which would be paid
by the informed traders.
26
For a meta order of length l, the total loss is of order
l∆p∞ ≈ δσT
√
1− µ
µ
lδ+1/2
E (l2δ−1)
≈ δσT
√
1− µ
µ
l for δ ≈ 0.5 (7.3)
The constants being of order 1, we see that for any l the additional cost is a few ticks per
trade (which is non-negligible). This computation allows one to estimate the collective gain
in improving arbitrage strategies (market makers have less risk, informed traders execute
at better prices). Of course, we considered here in the worst case where the market maker
does not make a difference at all between noise and informed traders, so the loss may be
overestimated - but it gives the order of magnitude, which is the tick. One interpretation of
these few ticks is that they are gained by setting a bigger spread.
One could argue that markets become meaningless if middle men trade a too large part
of the volume. But, if they are clever enough (competitive enough), they only react to
informed trades (and can estimate how much information a trade contains). In our ideal
model, at least half of the trades are made by middle men, and nevertheless only informed
trades change the prices. In any way, they have no interest in moving the price (apart from
trying to set it as close as possible to the ideal price, which seems to contributes only to
stability).
8 Execution costs
8.1 Fast informed trading
The previous results and the ideas exposed above allow at least a qualitative interpretation
(before going further and computing optimal strategies). There is what we could call an im-
perfection in the market which comes from asymmetry of information between the informed
trader and the market maker: the decay to p∞. This may be exploited by the informed
trader to have a better execution price.
As there is no such thing as a continuous trading (since there is a minimal unit of vol-
ume), we understand that an optimal strategy may be non-trivial. Indeed, take a meta-order
of volume 100, a liquidation in one large order is exactly the same than a fast liquidation in
100 buckets. Thus there must be an optimal size for the buckets to minimize the impact.
Let us assume that the informed trader is still slow enough in comparison to noise traders
and market makers, so that they have the time to react. Let us also assume here that he
is the only informed trader while he executes his trade (so that the decay of market impact
totally depends on his behavior, which is approximately true if he is fast and big enough).
If the market impact function is scale invariant as we have assumed above, the price reaches
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p∞ at time t+ tmax = (1 + λ)tmax, where λ depends only on the correlation exponent γ (or
more generally on the correlation function of trades). The gain for the informed trader if
he resumes trading at that time is also the loss for the market maker ∆1(p∞), as defined by
eq.4.12:
∆1(p∞) =
∫ Leq
0
I(L+ l)dl −
∫ Leq
0
(p∞ + I(l))dl (8.1)
where, as before, I(l) is the transient market impact function and Leq is the volume of
trades needed to reach the correct price again, after complete decay to p∞. We now know
that p∞ =
pmax
δ+1
, I(l) = Clδ and also that p∞+ I(Leq) = I(L+Leq) by definition. Therefore,
eq.8.1 becomes
∆1(p∞) =
C(L+ Leq)
δ+1
δ + 1
− CL
δ+1
δ + 1
− Leqp∞ −
CLδ+1eq
δ + 1
(8.2)
which simplifies in
∆1(p∞) =
CLδ+1
δ + 1
((1 +
Leq
L
)δ+1 − 1− Leq
L
− (Leq
L
)δ+1) (8.3)
where Leq is defined by
p∞ = I(L+ Leq)− I(Leq) (8.4)
which reads, with the known expression of I(l) and p∞,
1
δ + 1
= (1 +
Leq
L
)δ − (Leq
L
)δ (8.5)
Therefore Leq
L
= f(δ), and if we define g(δ) = (1 + f(δ))δ+1 − 1 − f(δ) − f(δ)δ+1, the
expression 8.3 of the gain for the informed trader due to his strategy becomes
∆1(p∞) = g(δ)
C
δ + 1
Lδ+1 (8.6)
With the basic strategy, the cost of market impact would be C = C
δ+1
(L + Leq)
δ+1. The
relative gain is then
∆1(p∞)
C =
g(δ)
(1 + f(δ))δ+1
= G(δ) (8.7)
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Figure 13: The relative cost saving G(δ) due to the decay of market impact.
Remark 8.1. G(δ) is of order 0.02 to 0.06 depending on δ (cf. Fig.13). This means that
the gain can be a fixed fraction of the cost of market impact (which is not negligible).
Let us finally consider the following strategy, represented on fig.14 (which may not be
optimal) to estimate the cost saving obtained by using an appropriate execution strategy:
the informed trader begins with l0 trades, waits for the decay to be complete, then sends
l1 = Leq = f(δ)l0 market orders (just so as to reach the normal price again), etc. If we note
ln the size of the (n + 1)
th bucket, and Ln =
∑n
i=0 li the total volume submitted so far, the
size of the nth buckets size is then:
ln = Leq(Ln−1) = f(δ)Ln−1 (8.8)
so that the recursion relation for the volume submitted after n steps is
Ln = (1 + f(δ))Ln−1 (8.9)
The volume executed after N steps is therefore
LN = L0(1 + f(δ))
N (8.10)
and the cost saving in comparison to the the cost of the naive strategy CL
δ+1
δ+1
, using
formula 8.6 for each step, is
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Figure 14: For the strategy considered in the example, the price path is represented in red,
in function of the volume submitted (note that the trader does not trade during the decay,
which is thus immediate if the time unit is the volume submitted). The cost saving in
comparison to a VWAP is represented in beige: each area is equal to ∆1 computed above,
for the corresponding price.
∆strat,N =
N−1∑
n=0
∆1(p∞(Ln))
=
C
δ + 1
Lδ+10 g(δ)
N−1∑
n=0
(1 + f(δ))n(δ+1)
=
C
δ + 1
Lδ+1N g(δ)
N∑
n=1
(1 + f(δ))−n(δ+1)
=
C
δ + 1
Lδ+1N G(δ)
1− (1 + f(δ))−N(δ+1)
1− (1 + f(δ))−(δ+1) (8.11)
Remark 8.2. If we note Gmax(δ) = G(δ)1−(1+f(δ))−(δ+1) , then for any N the relative cost saving
belongs to [G(δ),Gmax(δ)], where G(δ) is the cost saving when only one step is realized (N = 1)
and Gmax(δ) is the cost saving if the number of steps is infinite (which is purely theoretical
since volumes cannot be smaller than the unit volume). G(δ) and Gmax(δ) are represented on
Fig.15.
This means that an optimal liquidation using variable trading rate can decrease the cost
of market impact up to 10% (at least, since the strategy above may be suboptimal) for δ of
order 0.5.
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Figure 15: Plot of G(δ) and Gmax(δ). The cost savings with the strategy proposed is of order
10% of the market impact cost. The actual savings are between the curves if N is finite, and
increase with N .
Let us finally consider execution times. According to the strategy presented above, a
meta-order in linear time, since LN market orders are submitted in time
TN =
N∑
k=0
LkNλ
N−k
= λN
N∑
k=0
(
1 + f(δ)
λ
)k
=
(1 + f(δ))N+1 − λN+1
1 + f(δ)− λ
∼ 1 + f(δ)
1 + f(δ)− λLN if λ < 1 + f(δ) (8.12)
Remark 8.3. We found numerically that λ . 1 in section 4.6 for the common values of δ,
for the slowest possible decay process.
Remark 8.4. A trivial strategy, consisting in executing one trade and wait for the decay
before executing the next one, would have a much better gain since it would almost allow one
to trade at price p
δ+1
instead of p for each trade and save 30 to 40% of the market impact cost
depending on δ (note that it is an upper bound to the potential savings). But the completion
time of this strategy would be quadratic in the volume:
T ′ ∼ λL
2
2
(8.13)
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8.2 Slow informed trading: the cost of VWAPs
Let us now consider the case where the informed trader does not represent a large part of
the overall informed trading (which is the case for small actors or if the trading rate is small
enough). In this case, the decay of market impact is not directly due to his behavior, but
to the behavior of the other informed traders. We have shown in section 5 that in this case,
the smaller the trading rate the smaller the impact. What about the cost of the strategy?
Let us introduce again the meta-order size lA of trader A, the number of periods during
which the global trend is constant N , the volume executed by trader A during the ith period
∆li, and the volume executed by trader B (the rest of the market) li. Let us assume that
the trading rate is constant during each period. Due to the perfect competition, the average
cost of the ∆li trades is equal to the permanent market impact I(li + ∆li) =
C
δ+1
(li + ∆li)
δ.
Noting i the sense of the global trend, if the initial price is set to zero, then the price of the
∆li trades is
pi =
C
δ + 1
i∑
k=0
k(lk + k∆lk)
δ (8.14)
since it is equal to the permanent impact of the previous trades plus the marginal cost
of the ∆li trades. Therefore the total cost of the strategy is:
C = C
δ + 1
N∑
i=0
∆li
i∑
k=0
k(lk + k∆lk)
δ (8.15)
Finding an optimal execution strategy amounts to minimizing this quantity with respect
to the ∆li.
Remark 8.5. The quantities li are not known beforehand, therefore the optimal strategy may
be dynamical.
Let us determine the cost of rapidity for constant trading rates µ˜ for trader A and µ for
trader B. The expression of ∆li is given by 5.3. Then
C = C
δ + 1
µ˜
µ
N∑
i=0
li
i∑
k=0
k
(
1 + k
µ˜
µ
)δ
lδk (8.16)
If µ˜ µ,
C = C
δ + 1
µ˜
µ
N∑
i=0
li
i∑
k=0
k
(
1 + kδ
µ˜
µ
)
lδk (8.17)
If we make the approximation that E(klδk) = 0, since each period is independent (by
definition of our model), the expected cost is
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E(C) = Cδ
δ + 1
(
µ˜
µ
)2
E
(
N∑
i=0
li
i∑
k=0
lδk|
N∑
i=0
li =
µ
µ˜
lA
)
(8.18)
Remark 8.6. In the particular case where there is only one period (either because lA is very
small or µ˜ is large, or because l0 happens to be large),
E(C) ∼ µ˜1−δlδ+1A (8.19)
The cost of trading is here roughly proportional to the square root of the participation
rate. The opposite situation would be the case where there would be exactly lA periods of the
same size (trader A would then trade a unit volume in each period). Then
E(C) ∼ l2A (8.20)
and the cost would not depend on the participation rate. In the reality (with no approxi-
mation for eq.8.16), one would expect
E(C) ∼ µ˜β(µ˜)where 0 < β(µ˜) < 1− δ and is increasing. (8.21)
Numerical results are shown on fig.16.
Figure 16: The expected cost of the strategy E(C) with constant rate µ˜, in function of µ˜
µ
(log-log scale). The constant β ∈ (0.1, 0.2) for δ = 0.5.
33
Remark 8.7. The average cost of trading gets smaller when the participation rate µ˜ → 0.
However, the optimal execution strategy is a trade-off between the expectation of the cost and
the variance (which grows with µ˜). It is then immediate to find general solutions for given
β.
The variance of the cost can be computed from 8.17, by assuming that k and lk are
independent:
E(V) =
(
C
δ + 1
)2(
µ˜
µ
)2
E
 N∑
i=0
l2i
( i∑
k=0
lδk
)2
+
δ2µ˜2
µ2
i∑
k=0
l2δk
− E(C)2 (8.22)
Again, the extreme cases are l0 = lA where V ∼ l
3
A
µ˜
and li = 1 where V ∼ l
2+2δ
A
µ˜2δ
. For
δ ' 1/2, the variance always behaves like
E(V) ∼ C2 l
3
A
µ˜
(8.23)
Remark 8.8. The variance for a pure brownian motion would be
E(Vb) = E
(∫ lAµ˜
0
µ˜tσdWt
)2 = ∫ lAµ˜
0
(µ˜t)2 σ2dt =
σ2l3A
3µ˜
(8.24)
and would have the same qualitative dependance in the parameters (recall that C ∼ σ).
In the case of a constant-rate execution, the optimal static strategy is therefore the result
of the classical mean-variance optimization:
µ˜ = argmin (E(−C)− λE(V)) (8.25)
where λ represents the risk-aversion of the informed trader.
Remark 8.9. The previous reasoning can be made for variable µ˜, in order to find optimal
dynamical strategies.
9 Summary and comments
The framework that we set in our model has the following nice properties:
• Prices are discrete, so any real quantity exists in our framework.
• Consistent with economic theory, information is incorporated into prices thanks to a
non-zero permanent impact. The informational content of trades varies though, as
more predictable orders have less impact.
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• Prices are martingales even though the order flow is autocorrelated and private infor-
mation is incorporated. Concerning public information, one could add a jump process
which would not affect our results.
• In spite of a concave impact function, prices are not manipulable. This comes from the
fact that the fundamental impact is the impact of the aggregated order flow and not
the renormalized impact: it is the way the agents fit into the market that defines their
impact. Small meta-orders being essentially executed during one only trend, they have
a concave impact, but large meta-orders are executed while the background trends
change - the memory of the market in erased in some sort on that time scales, so that
impact becomes additive and thus linear. The concavity on short time scales can be
viewed as a premium paid for fast execution.
• It provides a natural interpretation for the latent order book - and one could also find
the shape of the displayed order-book.
• The competition between market makers, arbitragers, and their ”intelligence”, are
present in what we called the market maker: his response to the order flow - coming
from classical investors or news traders - consists in his limit orders placing strategy.
Any kind of statistical arbitrage should be seen as intentions to get closer to the ideal
price path. The benefits of such strategies, in a market where competition is not
perfect, can be computed.
• It explains many empirical results about the renormalized impact, the aggregated
market impact, the cost of VWAPs.
• It explains why the observed impact, transient or permanent, varies among traders,
and shows how the quality of a strategy can be deduced from the observed permanent
impact.
A few things have not been studied in this paper - whereas the framework would allow
it. The most important is certainly the spread, which has no reason to emerge here since the
adverse selection of private information is what defines the strategy of the market-maker.
To study the market impact, we did not need to consider public information. A way to
integrate it would be to add a jump process to our price process, to which we could associate
an adverse selection. The spread would emerge naturally as a compensation for adverse
selection.
This leads to the last reflection of this paper. Until here, we have considered the trends
- or what we call the informed trader in the first sections - uniquely from a statistical point
of view, which was enough for our study because no other information is available to the
rest of the market - what we called the market maker. But now if we consider the filtration
which contains the private information of the informed trader, then - now assuming perfect
competition between the informed traders, news arbitragers, etc - he must behave so that
his permanent impact is the expectation of the price conditioned on his private information.
In other words, the (informed) order flow must be such that the additional jump process
corresponding to public information is a martingale. It is now possible to understand the
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noise trader - apparently an absurd agent until here - who comes from the heterogeneity of
private information between the informed traders. So it appears that people who trade with
the less accurate information tend to lose money...
Stated this way, the notion of price manipulation appears in a brand new light. If some
trader pushes the price up with no underlying justification, his trades will then be anti-
correlated to the jump process - which will no longer be a martingale. And indeed, even
without any notion of fundamental value of the price, one senses that if a buy trend was
not followed by any good public information, the price would eventually come back to its
original level. Price manipulation, in this context, could only be achieved by momentum
trading which would only shift the price while it occurs - and this could only appear for
huge volumes because of the argument that immediately follows. In any case, someone who
would try to manipulate the price would be arbitraged - and lose money.
The last question will then be: what is the difference between the {public+private infor-
mation} process, and the {public information} process. Indeed, since one trader’s informa-
tion becomes a piece of information for all the other agents, one could sense that the former
process may be more unstable than the latter. This kind of collective behavior has been
studied in detail ([5] for example).
10 Conclusion
We have shown that the zero-profit condition for a market-maker resulting in perfect com-
petition - and the martingale condition - leads to an optimal market-making strategy in a
market in which the order flow is correlated. In a particular case, we have shown that it im-
poses a particular shape for the Bare Market Impact function, and gives a relation between
its shape while the trend is occurring and the price after the completion (which is non-zero),
and the correlations in order flow present in the market. We have made the computation for
the empirical shape of the order flow correlations found in [10], which leads asymptotically to
a power law market impact. We have found general expressions for the Renormalized Market
Impact function and provided a way to compute it in any particular situation. In particular,
for power-law correlations in the market, it is found to be power-law for small volumes and
to become progressively linear for large volumes, thus forbidding price manipulation. We
have seen that the different strategies for submitting a meta-order have different costs, due
partly to the decay after the trends and partly to the trading rate. In the case of a VWAP,
we have expressed this cost explicitly, and shown that it increases as a power-law of the
trading rate, with exponent ∼ 0.1− 0.2. In introducing the notion of public information, we
have finally shown why the competition between informed traders definitively rules out any
price manipulation.
To conclude, let us ask the reverse question: why does reality looks like what we find
here. Indeed, in our whole study we have assumed that market makers were perfectly in-
formed and competitive, and therefore the shape of market impact that we have found is
the average shape that we would find in ideal markets: the similarity to real data actually
suggests that markets are not far from being ideal from this point of view.
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